




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# **Mozambique's Accord With South Africa: Genesis and Prospects**

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**An Intelligence Assessment**

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ALA 84-10061  
June 1984

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# **Mozambique's Accord With South Africa: Genesis and Prospects**

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**An Intelligence Assessment**

This paper was prepared by [redacted]  
[redacted] Office of African and Latin American  
Analysis. It was coordinated with the Directorate  
of Operations. [redacted]

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Comments and queries are welcome and may be  
directed to the Chief, Central Africa Branch, Africa  
Division, ALA, [redacted]

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**Mozambique's Accord  
With South Africa:  
Genesis and Prospects**

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**Key Judgments**

*Information available  
as of 25 May 1984  
was used in this report.*

The Nkomati nonaggression pact signed on 16 March by Mozambican President Samora Machel and South African Prime Minister P. W. Botha—and its tacit approval by most other black states—undercuts the African National Congress (ANC), the principal South African black insurgent organization, which is already hampered by severe operational constraints. In our judgment, the accord will have a major regional impact, making it easier for Pretoria to reach similar security agreements with other neighboring states. Machel's willingness to deal openly with Pretoria significantly reduces the stigma among other black states of negotiating with the white regime. The agreement is therefore a major achievement for South African regional policy and an admission by Mozambique that its course of confrontation with the apartheid regime in Pretoria has failed.

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Maputo, unlike Pretoria, will reap few short-term benefits from the rapprochement. Even the most optimistic assessments by Mozambican officials suggest that the rebel Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) will continue to be active for six to eight months despite inevitably diminishing stockpiles due to the withdrawal of South African support, and that although RENAMO's activity is likely to decline thereafter, it will remain a problem for at least two years. Major economic benefits also will be slow in coming—the continuing insurgency will discourage foreign investment and neither Pretoria nor Western donors appear willing or able to pump massive economic assistance into the country. Pretoria, however, appears to be making serious efforts to provide immediate economic benefits within the constraints of its own serious economic problems.

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In our judgment, however, Maputo is unlikely to abrogate the accord. Machel has linked his future to the rapprochement with South Africa and it would be politically difficult to change policy directions again. Moreover, over the long term Mozambique probably can expect some additional benefits from the accord as RENAMO's capabilities slowly erode, and there is some increase in Western and South African investment and economic aid.

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The accord, however, will remain fragile and could be undermined by a number of factors. Unabated security and economic problems in Mozambique, especially if they continue into late 1985, or a perceived South African failure to abide by the agreement could force Machel to reverse his position. Additionally, a sharp increase in ANC activity could lead South African hardliners to urge retaliation against Mozambique.

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Mozambique's rapprochement with South Africa undercuts Soviet interests and prestige in the region by belying the illusion of Maputo's revolutionary solidarity with Moscow, and by implicitly pointing out the inadequacies of Soviet economic and military assistance. By weakening the ANC it also obstructs Moscow's long-term objective of overthrowing the white minority regime in Pretoria. In our judgment, the Soviets do not appear to have written off Mozambique, however, and are likely to continue providing military and limited economic assistance to Maputo while hoping that the accord will unravel. Toward that end the Soviets probably will employ private overtures and disinformation to sow suspicions of US and South African intentions.

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Because of Washington's close identification with the process leading up to Nkomati, the accord opens up new opportunities for Western, and especially US, interests in Mozambique. Additionally, if, as we expect, the accord holds and provides at least a modest improvement in Mozambique's political and economic plight, the standing of the United States in black Africa should be enhanced.

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
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**Contents**

	<i>Page</i>
Key Judgments	iii
Introduction	1
Mozambique's Desperate Plight	1
Machel Looks for a Way Out	2
The South African Perspective	4
The Soviet Perspective	5
Prospects	6
Little Immediate Gratification . . .	7
. . . But Staying the Course	7
Implications for the United States	8
A Breakdown of the Agreement	8
Signposts	9

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## Mozambique's Accord With South Africa: Genesis and Prospects

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### Introduction

In a formal ceremony on 16 March at the border town of Nkomati, Mozambican President Samora Machel and South African Prime Minister P. W. Botha signed a pact stating that neither government would allow its territory to be used for aggression against the other. In practical terms, Pretoria agreed to stop supporting the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) insurgents in return for Maputo's pledge to prevent guerrillas of the African National Congress (ANC) from using Mozambique as a springboard for attacks against South Africa. In addition, the three months of negotiations leading to the Nkomati nonaggression pact—the first such formal, public agreement with South Africa by a black-ruled state—were accompanied by parallel talks that envisaged a major increase in economic cooperation between the two countries.

Following the signing of the accord, both sides took immediate steps to carry out the agreement.

in early March Prime Minister Botha had ordered the cessation of all South African assistance to RENAMO, and so far Pretoria appears to be implementing this directive. According to the US Embassy, Mozambique has told all ANC personnel, with the exception of 10 members serving in the group's diplomatic mission in Maputo, either to report to UN-sponsored refugee camps or leave the country. Mozambican security forces also staged raids on ANC facilities in March and seized sizable caches of arms, according to press accounts

This assessment reviews the factors leading to Machel's decision to reverse Mozambique's long-standing policy of confrontation toward South Africa, and examines the short-term risks and obstacles that Maputo faces. It also assesses the prospects for and implications of this singular event with particular attention to the South African and Soviet perspective, as well as the implications for the United States.

### Mozambique's Desperate Plight

By all accounts, Mozambique faces staggering economic problems that have been intensified by the widespread RENAMO insurgency that the government has been unable to control. The US Embassy reports that RENAMO—with substantial material and tactical support from South Africa—has denied the government control over the majority of the countryside, and has succeeded in interdicting most of the roads around major commercial centers. Guerrillas regularly interrupt rail traffic and sabotage bridges, sections of the Beira-Mutare oil pipeline, and electric power lines from the Cahora Bassa hydroelectric project. In addition to these economic disruptions,

when the Nkomati accord was signed Maputo was spending over \$150,000 daily—a massive sum by Mozambican standards—to finance the counterinsurgency.

In our judgment, the precarious security situation also rendered ineffective Maputo's efforts to acquire large-scale developmental economic assistance from the West, the publicly stated principal objective of Machel's visit to Western Europe in October 1983. Furthermore, RENAMO has carried out its public threat in early 1983 to kill, kidnap, and harass foreign technicians and advisers, causing several economic development projects to be delayed or canceled.

The continued depredations of the insurgents have compounded the economic distress caused by mismanagement and three years of drought and contributed to the famine that has plagued central and southern Mozambique since 1980. Western observers estimate that at least 100,000 people died of starvation in Mozambique during the last half of 1983 and another 750,000 needed food relief in one southern province



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Prime Minister Botha and  
President Machel sign the  
Nkomati accord



alone. These desperate conditions, in our view, probably convinced Machel that business-as-usual policies with South Africa would not work, and that he had no alternative but to change course. [REDACTED]

#### Machel Looks for a Way out

By 1982 some of the leaders in Maputo apparently were exploring different approaches to the country's problems. Embassy reporting indicates that pragmatists within the party, critical of the performance of the centralized economy and the government's emphasis on large agricultural and industrial projects, succeeded in preventing the party's fourth congress from meeting as scheduled in early 1982. When the congress was held in late April 1983, moderates led by Machel seized the initiative and proposed a modification of Marxist economic doctrine that was intended to give a freer hand to the private sector—particularly in agriculture—according to US Embassy reporting. The move apparently outmaneuvered the rigid ideologues, led by number-two party leader Marcelino dos

Santos, and many party radicals lost their key economic policymaking positions. [REDACTED]

Although party leaders still used Marxist rhetoric and adopted radical postures in the international arena, we believe that they pressed for more pragmatism on domestic economic issues. The US Embassy reports that after the April 1983 congress professionalism and technical competence became the criteria used to pick officials for key jobs rather than their ideological credentials. For example, Jacinto Veloso, a white former Portuguese Air Force pilot regarded by US officials as a nondoctrinaire socialist and a competent administrator, took control of economic affairs and later played a critical role in negotiations with Pretoria and Washington. The government began to emphasize the need for some private enterprise and small-scale farming. Mozambique's economic plight, however, was sufficiently desperate that efforts at self-improvement could not succeed in isolation—Machel also had to reexamine Mozambique's external ties. [REDACTED]

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**Staggering Economic Problems**

*Although comprehensive data are lacking, the US Embassy reports that the Mozambican economy has undergone a catastrophic decline since the country achieved independence in 1975. During 1975-78, GDP fell by 33 percent, according to our estimates. We believe that GDP, by 1982 judged to be less than \$1.5 billion, fell by a further 18 percent during 1983, largely because of the inefficiency and disincentives of Mozambique's pursuit of unrealistic socialist policies.* [redacted]

*Mozambique's hostility toward South Africa also deprived the new regime of its most important source of income. Under an agreement reached in 1909 with Portugal, South Africa would use the port of Maputo for almost half of the imported goods intended for its gold mining region in return for the right to recruit miners in southern Mozambique. At independence, about 118,000 Mozambican miners worked in South Africa and remittances from their salaries, in addition to transit fares and spending by South African tourists, represented most of Mozambique's external income. However, according to South African press sources only 45,000 or so Mozambican miners are now left in South Africa, tourism has ceased, and transportation is greatly reduced.* [redacted]

*Sugar, cotton, tea, shrimp, and cashew nuts now account for nearly 60 percent of Mozambique's foreign exchange earnings and 45 percent of GNP. By 1977, according to Embassy and press reporting, production of cashews, sugar, and cotton had dropped to half of preindependence levels. A decline in world prices for sugar and cashews since 1980 has shriveled export earnings even further and widened the current account gap. The US Embassy reports that in 1982 Mozambican exports totaled only \$385 million, while its imports amounted to approximately \$706 million.* [redacted]

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*Alternating severe droughts and floods in almost every province in the past three years have resulted in poor harvests, unrest in the countryside, and the migration of large numbers of people to urban areas and to neighboring Zimbabwe. Despite food aid in 1983 totaling more than 225,000 tons—all but 35,000 tons of which came from Western donors—press reports indicate that nearly 2 million people are still dependent on famine relief provided by foreign donor countries. The government says nearly 5 million of the country's 13 million people are affected by drought-caused food shortages.* [redacted]

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*Flagging enthusiasm for Marxist doctrine at home was paralleled by growing dissatisfaction with Moscow. Foreign diplomats in Maputo noted that continued guerrilla successes, despite heavy infusions of Soviet military equipment and training—at least \$240 million worth in 1983 alone—and a sizable Soviet, East German, and Cuban advisory presence, had led Maputo to question the efficacy of Moscow's military assistance. As the economic crisis worsened and famine spread, Soviet unwillingness or inability to provide substantial economic aid, especially food, also contributed to Machel's increasingly evident disillusionment with the Soviets, according to diplomatic reporting.* [redacted]

*By early 1983 the cumulative effects of increasingly catastrophic economic and security conditions caused Machel, in our judgment, to worry that popular*

*support was eroding and that further government inaction could prove politically disastrous. Embassy reporting also suggests that the military's ineffectiveness against RENAMO undercut the position of hardliners within the party, and that Machel and other pragmatists were relatively unimpeded in their attempts to redirect foreign and domestic policy in mid-1983.* [redacted]

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*In our judgment, Mozambique's primary motive for improving relations with South Africa was to end Pretoria's support for RENAMO, in the hope of so weakening the insurgents that Maputo could defeat them. Mozambique also apparently wanted an immediate economic return and sought in its talks with*

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### ***Machel Firmly in Control***

*In our judgment, Machel dominates policymaking in Maputo. US Embassy reporting indicates that he plays a prominent and personal role in all significant decisions. The Embassy reports that his national popularity, which has skyrocketed in the wake of Nkomati, and his personal charisma apparently have made it difficult for any strong opposition to emerge. As an added precaution, however, Machel made a number of moves to safeguard against internal threats to his rule prior to negotiating the accord with South Africa.*

*He restructured the defense and security leadership and placed trusted aides in positions that would enable them to thwart threats to his power.*

*US Embassy and knowledgeable press and academic reporting has provided some insights. In our judgment, the key fissure within the ruling party, FRELIMO, has been between pro-Soviet ideologues led by party Secretary General Marcelino dos Santos and the pragmatic nationalists led by President Machel.*

*Evidence available to us indicates that, on the surface at least, there is little ethnic or racial tension within the party despite the presence and important influence of large numbers of ethnic Portuguese, East Indians, and mulattoes. In our judgment, however, racial tensions may simmer beneath the surface. Machel's economic adviser, Jacinto Veloso, a white, played the key role in negotiating the Nkomati accord, while black Foreign Minister Chissano played no role in the discussions with South Africa, and privately expressed pessimism about their outcome. During the party congress last year Maj. Gen. Armando Guebuza, a black, was relieved as Governor General of Sofala Province for his public attempts to place the blame for economic malaise on East Indian and Portuguese Mozambicans. Racial factors could become more important should Mozambicans become disillusioned with the accords and begin looking for scapegoats among white party leaders for "selling out" to South Africa.*

Pretoria new South African investments in agriculture, industry, transportation, port facilities, and tourism, according to press accounts and US Embassy reporting. Maputo also encouraged the South Africans to increase their use of Mozambican railways and ports and reopened Mozambique to South African tourists.

US Embassy reporting indicates that Maputo also finally realized that an end to the insurgency was a prerequisite to greater foreign investment and Western economic assistance. Machel's much ballyhooed visit to Western Europe in late 1983 proved to be long on European promises and expressions of sympathy, but short on concrete achievements. Machel, in our judgment, probably came to believe that only an agreement with Pretoria would persuade Western governments, especially Washington, that his regime was pragmatic, not dominated by the Soviets, and therefore worthy of increased Western economic project aid. Moreover, without some promise that Maputo could stabilize the security situation, the threat to Western aid workers effectively deterred any significant expansion of Western economic involvement in Mozambique.

### ***The South African Perspective***

The Nkomati accord represents a singular achievement for South African regional policy and a personal triumph for Prime Minister Botha, who has long pressed the neighboring states to enter formal security arrangements. By forcing Mozambique—a self-proclaimed Marxist state with a sizable Soviet and Cuban presence—to negotiate openly with them, the South Africans have won an implicit recognition of the Botha regime's legitimacy as the governing body in South Africa, Machel's protestations notwithstanding.

The nonaggression pact has significant security pay-offs in addition to the political benefits. In our judgment, the withdrawal of Mozambican support from the ANC—already denied the use of territory for cross-border operations by South Africa's other

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***The Insurgencies and Their Mentors***

*Although we do not have detailed information on the specific amount of support formerly provided to RENAMO and the ANC by South Africa and Mozambique, respectively, we believe that both insurgent groups were highly dependent on their patrons' backing. [redacted] in addition to providing material support, the South Africans trained RENAMO troops and officers in South Africa and often provided advisers, and occasionally troops, for operations in Mozambique. South African materiel was also stockpiled in Malawi for insurgent cross-border operations, according to Embassy and defense attache reporting. In our judgment, RENAMO's tactics—generally hitting economic targets and avoiding risky attacks on government troops or supply areas—suggest an ability to rely almost completely on an outside source for arms supplies. [redacted]*

*Mozambique was the most important transit point for ANC guerrillas operating in South Africa, with perhaps as many as two-thirds of ANC attacks originating in Mozambique. South African officials believe, probably correctly, that most ANC operations were planned in Maputo. Additionally, Moscow, which supplies the organization with virtually all of its weapons, apparently delivered arms directly to Mozambique for distribution to the insurgents. Mozambican officials were startled at the quantity and sophistication of the Soviet weaponry discovered during a series of raids on ANC facilities in March according to the US Embassy. [redacted]*

neighbors—deals the organization a severe military and political blow by eliminating its most important staging area for tactical guerrilla operations and by causing it significant loss of face. The ANC now appears to us to be in disarray; so far it has been unsuccessful in its efforts to undo the damage to its standing caused by Machel's cessation of military support. [redacted]

From a broader perspective, the South African-Mozambican agreement probably will have an important demonstration effect throughout the region and

will make it easier for Pretoria to reach similar agreements with other neighboring states. We believe Machel's willingness to deal openly with the South African regime has reduced significantly the stigma that similar agreements would have for other black African states. Soon after the Nkomati accords were signed, Swaziland publicly announced that it had secretly signed a similar agreement with South Africa two years ago. US Embassy reporting indicates Botswana and Lesotho are now being pressed into signing similar security arrangements with Pretoria. Moreover, we believe Nkomati has done much to lessen the reluctance of black African countries outside of the region to deal with South Africa. For the first time several West African countries seriously considered a state visit by the South African Prime Minister during his trip to Europe in late May, although all of them eventually decided the time was not yet ripe for a such a move. [redacted]

The Nkomati accord also will serve to reduce South Africa's international isolation, particularly in the West, since Machel, by negotiating a formal treaty with Pretoria, has tacitly broken South Africa's pariah status. Mozambique's pursuit of greater South African economic involvement also undercuts arguments that Western countries should impose economic sanctions against Pretoria. [redacted]

***The Soviet Perspective***

Although Moscow has publicly refrained from condemning Machel's rapprochement with Pretoria, the agreement, in our judgment, clearly undercuts Soviet interests and prestige by tarnishing Maputo's revolutionary credentials and opening new opportunities for Western inroads in Mozambique. Moreover, it diminishes the already limited ANC threat, reduces the Soviet ability to supply the ANC with weapons and supplies, and thus obstructs the USSR's long-term objective of increasing its influence on the continent and undermining the white minority regime in Pretoria. [redacted]

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RENAMO guerrillas in the field



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For the short term, the Soviets and their Eastern bloc allies, although privately distressed at Mozambique's opening to the West and its tacit acknowledgment of Pretoria's regional dominance, seem resigned to waiting for events to play themselves out, according to US Embassy and defense attache reporting. In part, the Soviets may be relieved to see the West shoulder the economic burden they are unwilling or unable to carry for Mozambique. In our judgment, the short-term strategy of the Soviets and their allies will be low key—waiting in the hope the accord will unravel, with private overtures, public rhetoric, and disinformation aimed at casting doubt on US and South African intentions and commitment.

bargain in the long run, and are prepared to wait until South African actions create more favorable circumstances for Soviet initiatives in southern Africa.

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#### Prospects

In our judgment, Moscow has not yet written off Mozambique. In early April the Soviet Ambassador in Maputo told the local media that the USSR planned to supply Maputo with additional economic assistance, including petroleum supplies at concessional prices. These efforts, notwithstanding, we believe the Soviets cannot but be unhappy about Machel's eagerness in implementing his new agreements with Pretoria. They probably believe, however, that the South Africans will not keep their side of the

As the driving force on the Mozambican side behind the accord, Machel has a great stake in its success. Government propaganda portraying Nkomati as a great Mozambican victory has almost certainly contributed to unrealistic popular expectations that the accord will be a panacea for the country's economic plight. Many Western observers believe that if Machel does not receive fairly rapid economic and security returns for his diplomatic gamble, he will be the victim of a backlash within the country and may even lose his hold on power. We agree that Machel probably will be disappointed in the short-term pay-offs, but at present there are few overt expressions of dissatisfaction, and Western diplomats agree that there is no other leader with Machel's national appeal or charisma.

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**Little Immediate Gratification . . .**

Mozambican officials have indicated to the US Embassy that the security situation has worsened since the signing of the accord. Although our analysis indicates the overall number of guerrilla attacks has reached its lowest point in three years, available evidence suggests the insurgency has become more focused. RENAMO has stepped up its attacks against important economic targets, including the pipeline to Zimbabwe, the road linking Maputo to South Africa, and powerlines that provide Maputo with electricity.

the insurgents' offensive is an attempt to prove that even without Pretoria's support RENAMO remains a viable organization that is capable of forcing the Machel regime into a powersharing arrangement.

A few senior Mozambican officials, however, have told Western diplomats that they believe RENAMO attacks will begin to decline within six to eight months of the signing of the accord, although they will remain troublesome for at least two years. The insurgency, in our judgment, probably will begin to disintegrate into disorganized armed banditry in 1985 as RENAMO exhausts its stockpile of South African-supplied munitions and begins to feel the loss of Pretoria's advisory and communications support. Guerrilla activity probably will persist in the countryside, however, and will continue to frustrate the regime's efforts to increase food production and attract foreign investors.

We also doubt that Mozambique will reap major short-term economic gains from the accord. Pretoria has told US officials that it lacks the capital to finance the improvements in Mozambique's underdeveloped economic base necessary to support significantly increased industrial activity and tourism.

a major increase in South African use of the port of Maputo will depend on expensive improvements in the port to make it competitive with South African ports.

On the brighter side, a South African bank recently extended a \$50 million line of credit to Mozambique in April, which Maputo used to finance badly needed oil and food imports and to cover short-term loan payments. In addition, under the terms of an agreement signed in May by Mozambique, South Africa, and Portugal, Maputo may realize hard currency earnings of as much as \$9 million annually from the operation of the Cahora Bassa hydroelectric project. Even this, however, depends on Maputo's ability to prevent RENAMO from disrupting the flow of power to South Africa.

The prospects for greatly enhanced Western economic aid and investment over the next two years, in our judgment, are mixed at best. Even if insurgent violence should decline into armed banditry, the continued threat to foreign advisory personnel will further inhibit foreign investors already discouraged by the country's woefully inadequate transportation and communications system. Traditional Western donors, beset by their own economic problems and faced with competing demands for aid, appear unlikely to provide the massive project aid Mozambique needs.

**. . . But Staying the Course**

Notwithstanding the short-term disappointments, we believe that Machel has little choice but to adhere to the accord. Mozambique's old policy of confrontation with Pretoria contributed significantly to its economic and military failures, despite substantial Soviet support. Also, Machel can have few illusions that ending his rapprochement with South Africa would improve Maputo's situation. Having broken ranks with other black African states—and with his own more radical followers—by negotiating a nonaggression pact with South Africa, Machel, in our judgment, has irrevocably linked his prestige and political future to the new policy.

In the long term, Machel's policy of accommodation probably will result in benefits that otherwise would

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not have been forthcoming. Reduced South African pressure is by itself a net gain. An insurgency whose capabilities will erode over time clearly presents less of a challenge to the Machel regime than an insurgency with continued support from South Africa. The longer term economic benefits afforded by the accord probably will go primarily to the coastal cities and do little to improve the economic situation in the rural areas; nevertheless, additional funds flowing into the urban areas would enable Machel to funnel money into projects benefiting key government and party officials, and will help to ensure their continued support. Moreover, additional South African and Western assistance might also allow the regime to forestall unrest in the cities by helping living standards to improve somewhat. Thus, while Machel's diplomatic about-face at Nkomati is, in our judgment, unlikely to spark a dramatic recovery from Mozambique's present economic and military morass, the payoff probably will be sufficient to enable Machel to preserve his regime. [ ]

#### Implications for the United States

US Embassy reporting indicates most African countries are aware of the deep US involvement in helping to bring Pretoria and Maputo together. If, therefore, Machel's accommodation with Pretoria results in some improvement in Mozambique's situation—and we expect it will—the standing of the United States in black Africa probably will be enhanced significantly. At a minimum, US ties with South Africa will impinge less on Washington's relations with black Africa because Machel largely has removed the stigma of dealing with Pretoria. In addition, the perception that US initiatives have worked in southern Africa will enhance Washington's influence in other African trouble spots and might lead some African countries now leaning toward the Soviet Union or assuming anti-Western stances in international forums—such as Congo, Angola, and Madagascar—to temper their positions. [ ]

In the less likely event that the fragile arrangement between Mozambique and South Africa should break down and the cycle of violence start up again, the impression in the region of US-South African collusion would lead many black Africans to hold the US

responsible and would constitute a minor setback to US interests. Black African governments probably would look at further US policy ventures in the region with skepticism, perhaps viewing them as primarily concerned with the security of the white minority regime in Pretoria. This would be especially true, in our judgment, if US support for the agreement was not accompanied by the significant economic aid and investment that we believe Machel expects. [ ]

#### A Breakdown of the Agreement

Despite Machel's close identification with Mozambique's rapprochement with Pretoria, continued security and economic problems, or a perceived South African failure to abide by the terms of the agreement, could lead Machel to alter his position. This is always a possibility, in our view, since the mercurial leader confounded most observers by his decision to enter into the accord in the first place. [ ]

Moreover, Mozambican adherence to the agreement probably depends on Machel's remaining in power. Pro-Soviet hardliners in the ruling party, such as Interior Minister Guebuza and party Secretary General dos Santos, who only grudgingly agreed to lend public support to the accord, might be emboldened to move against Machel by the lack of tangible short-term benefits from Nkomati. They probably would point to continuing security problems as evidence of Pretoria's duplicity and contrast Moscow's steadfast military assistance commitment with the absence of an immediate large-scale Western economic contribution. [ ]

Under these circumstances, Maputo could opt for outright abrogation of the pact, alleging South African failure to shut off the flow of arms to RENAMO. A more likely scenario, however, would be a Mozambican attempt to have the onus of abrogation fall on Pretoria by discreetly turning a blind eye to ANC activities in Mozambique in the hope that an ANC attack would provoke Pretoria to renege. [ ]

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- *Increased Soviet, East German, and Cuban involvement in Mozambique.* A major augmentation of Soviet Bloc economic and military aid, which we view as extremely unlikely at this time, could conceivably embolden Maputo to decide that it could survive a return to a confrontational posture toward Pretoria and cooler relations with the West.

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**Signposts**

A breakdown of the agreement is likely to be preceded by one or more of the following indicators:

- *Failure of security and economic conditions to improve appreciably after more than a year.* Continued insurgent activity at or near present levels would lead to allegations that Pretoria was continuing to supply RENAMO and would severely undermine Mozambican support for the agreement.

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Maputo is satisfied with Pretoria's conduct since Nkomati, but would have to reevaluate its stance toward the accord if heavy insurgent activity continued into 1985. The absence of economic gains also would be likely to cause both the populace and key government officials to question the value of the accord.

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- *Renewed South African support for RENAMO.* A senior Mozambican official already has alleged to US Embassy officers that unauthorized flights into Mozambique from South Africa and Malawi have resumed, although this belief is not yet widely shared by other Mozambican leaders. In the absence of confirming data, we tend to discount such allegations.
- *Overt signs of disagreement within the Mozambican Government regarding policy toward South Africa.* Such friction would indicate not only that Mozambican adherence to the accord was being questioned, but could signify that Machel's position was becoming tenuous.
- *A sharp increase in ANC operations, especially those involving heavy loss of life.* We believe that many key South African officials, especially those in the security apparatus, would be quick to suspect Mozambican complicity and to urge retaliation.

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